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Data And Methods
HMO market share. The Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA's) standard 20 percent sample of its beneficiary-level Denominator File was used to calculate the HMO share of the Medicare market for December 1989 and December 1994. This file includes demographic variables for each beneficiary, whether the beneficiary is eligible for Medicare or Medicaid (or both), and whether the beneficiary is enrolled in an HMO. It distinguishes between enrollment through risk contracts and cost contracts. Market share is calculated as the percentage of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a risk-contract HMO. 3 Although I present both national and state figures, most of my analysis pertains to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level. MSAs are aggregations of counties defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census to represent economic units. Analyses of Medicare often involve defining the rural area of each state (that is, the non-MSA section) as a separate entity. As of July 1993 there were 310 MSAs and forty-eight rural areas. Here MSA typically refers to both.
Data on the HMO share of the general health care market were
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derived from a recent survey of health insurance conducted by the National Research Corporation (NRC). 4 A nationally representative sample of more than 200,000 households received the questionnaire, and about two-thirds completed it. Because the NRC tabulates results only for MSAs with at least 300 respondents, we are limited to eighty-six MSAs, which include about half of all Medicare beneficiaries. General market share is presented as a percentage of the national mean, so a figure of 1.00 indicates that an MSA has the same market share as the national average. HMO payment rates. The rate at which Medicare pays HMOs is termed adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC). The AAPCC is set at 95 percent of Medicare's local fee-for-service cost and is published annually for each county. I calculated MSA-level AAPCCs by weighting each county's AAPCC by its number of beneficiaries.
AAPCC payment rates reflect geographic variation in both utilization rates and input prices. Since HMOs presumably have some control over utilization rates, I adjusted the AAPCC rates by only an index of input prices. My input price index is a weighted average of Medicare's two indices: the hospital wage index and the Geographic Practice Cost Index (GPCI) for physicians. 5 The weights are the proportions of Medicare payments made using one index or the other. The input price-adjusted AAPCC is presented as a percentage of the national mean of $382 per month.
share of the Medicare market is presumably greater when out-ofpocket premiums of HMOs are low and prescription drugs are covered, I calculated out-of-pocket premiums and drug coverage for several market areas. Where an HMO offers several Medicare options, I used the premium and drug coverage that pertain to the lowest-premium option. Because several HMOs in a market area may have different enrollments, I calculated the average premium by weighting each HMO's premium by its Medicare enrollment.
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Regression analysis. I used regression analysis to distinguish the independent impact of each variable of interest. HMO share of the Medicare market in 1994 was regressed on 1994 values for general market share, Medicare payment rate, and MSA size (as measured by the natural log of the number of beneficiaries in the MSA), and the 1989 values for HMO Medicare market share. 8 I also weighted each MSA by the size of its Medicare beneficiary population, so that coefficient estimators disproportionately reflect the experience of MSAs with many beneficiaries.
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Results
To provide a context, Exhibit 1 displays the growth in HMO share of the Medicare market over the past decade. The top curve shows DATAWATCH 203 total HMO enrollment, the figure typically used in policy discussions. Risk-based enrollment, the bottom curve, is the more appropriate concept for discussing the determinants of HMO market share in the context of cost-saving objectives. In the past decade risk-based enrollment has grown from 1.5 percent to nearly 8 per-
cent of the total Medicare market and now dominates Medicare HMO enrollment. At the end of 1985, the year that risk-contract regulations were promulgated, risk-contract enrollment was only 38 percent of total Medicare HMO enrollment. By the end of 1995 this figure had risen to 81 percent.
Demographic factors in Medicare HMO market share. Medicare HMO market share is highest among persons in their late sixties and early seventies (Exhibit 2). It declines for persons in their late seventies and early eighties. Even for those in their early eighties, however, HMO market share is essentially at the overall average. Only among beneficiaries older than age eighty-four does HMO market share fall sharply. 12 The difference between these two figures reflects the geographic concentration of HMO market share.
Determinants O f Market Share
What determines the degree of HMO penetration in a Medicare market? The answer to this question is key to the current policy debate over how much Medicare can save by increasing managed care enrollment. The primary factors I examine here are Medicare HMO payment rates, HMOs' share of the general health care market, HMOs' initial share of the Medicare market, and market size (defined by number of beneficiaries in the MSA). I first look directly at patterns of HMO concentration. I then use regression analysis to identify the independent impact of each factor. Medicare HMO payment rates. As the top panel of Exhibit 5 shows, HMO market share is higher in the MSAs with the highest DATAWATCH
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Medicare payment rates, but this pattern is only apparent at the top of the payment distribution. 13 Exhibit 6 shows the HMO share of the Medicare market for the ten largest MSAs. The same pattern generally appears at the more aggregate level, but there are a number of counterexamples: Portland (Exhibit 4) has the third highest market share in 1994 but one of the lowest payment rates of the large metropolitan areas. Conversely, New Orleans (not shown) and Detroit have negligible market shares and high payment rates. Because a high Medicare payment rate presumably allows HMOs to be financially viable with lower out-of-pocket premiums and broader coverage-which should facilitate HMOs' ability to enroll Medicare beneficiaries-I also investigated the relationship between AAPCC and out-of-pocket premiums for twelve MSAs (selected on the basis of high AAPCC, high market share, or both). Exhibit 7 arrays these MSAs in descending order of AAPCC. Market areas with high AAPCC are much more likely to have low out-ofpocket premiums than areas with low AAPCC are. E xcept for Detroit, all areas with Medicare HMO payment rates at least 5 percent above the national average have almost zero out-of-pocket premiums, whereas areas with lower payment rates usually have substantial out-of-pocket premiums. Similarly, most HMOs in areas with payment rates of at least 5 percent above the national average offer some sort of drug coverage. The exceptions (New Orleans and Detroit) are in market areas that have little or no competition.
14 That low premiums and broad coverage attract Medicare beneficiaries to HMOs is clear from a comparison of southern and northern California. Southern California has higher AAPCC, lower premiums, broader coverage, and a much higher HMO share of the Medicare market than is the case in northern California. However, Exhibit 7 offers several counterexamples. Portland, which has the lowest AAPCC in the exhibit, has the highest HMO share of the Medicare marker, and New Orleans, which has the highest AAPCC, has a negligible market share. These examples suggest that HMOs' share of the general health care market, which is high in Portland and low in New Orleans, is also important. shows that an initially high HMO share of the Medicare market is related to higher future growth in HMO market share. The strongest growth in market share occurred where HMOs already had a major share of the Medicare market. One reason for this is that rapid enrollment growth is facilitated by HMOs' having a reputation among the elderly. One study found that HMOs' reputations among the elderly vary widely by geography. 15 
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Discussion
These findings provide insight into how current proposals to change HMO payment rates are likely to affect Medicare HMO market share. In the short run, the effects of financial incentives, such as reducing geographic variation in payment rates and controlling growth in payment levels over the next seven years, are likely to be small. This is because the major factor leading to rapid growth in the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care in any given area is a strong base of HMO penetration in that areas general health care market. Payment rates have an impact, but it is a considerably smaller one. Reducing geographic variation by divorcing HMO payment rates from fee-for-service rates makes sense on its own merits, but it is unlikely to speed Medicare HMO enrollment much. 21 In the long run, the results indicate that the HMO share of the Medicare market will continue to grow, along with general HMO enrollment. The results provide encouraging evidence that the nonfinancial barriers to HMO enrollment for most Medicare beneficiaries are not substantial. One might expect HMOs to have trouble enrolling beneficiaries over age seventy-four, partly because these persons may be less flexible and receptive to change, and partly because many of them would have become eligible for Medicare before the Barriers do seem substantial for two groups: the disabled and persons eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare. The unusual health care needs of many of the disabled may make them particularly averse to accepting restrictions on choice of providers. In addition, disabled beneficiaries tend to see more providers than other beneficiaries see and hence have more provider ties that would be disrupted by HMO enrollment.
For the dually eligible, the low Medicare HMO penetration rate at first looks paradoxical, given the high HMO share in the Medicaid market (17 percent in 1994). 23 In no state is the HMO share of the dual market more than 10 percent. Even in states that pay most of their Medicaid program dollars through capitated arrangementsArizona (100 percent) and Tennessee (75 percent)-the HMO shares of their Medicare markets are low (9 percent and zero, respectively). A maze of administrative difficulties could be part of the problem, such as finding HMOs that participate in both programs.
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But two systemic factors are likely to be at least as important. First, even though states can mandate (under federal waiver) dually eligible beneficiaries to enroll in an HMO for their Medicaid services, states cannot mandate enrollment for Medicare services. Medicare is the first payer for these beneficiaries, so Medicare covers most acute care services, leaving drugs and copayments to Medicaid. Medicaid block grants would not change this situation because the barriers are on the Medicare side. The second factor is that, unlike most Medicare beneficiaries, whose out-of-pocket costs are reduced or coverage expanded by joining an HMO, dually eligible beneficiaries have their out-of-pocket costs covered by Medicaid, leaving them with little incentive to pursue HMO enrollment. 
